I will not support BootChamp running in this environment.For Mac users who also need to use a PC at work, home or just with specific applications, there is a solution. NOTE: The above instructions are only for testing. Enter the following command: $ csrutil enable.Launch Terminal from the Utilities menu.Boot to Recovery OS by restarting your machine and holding down the Command and R keys at startup.However if someone wants to experiment it would be interesting. Anyone want to get this a try and see if BootChamp would work afterwards? The thing is, SIP is a good security feature, it shouldn't be disabled, and it's not worth it to disable it to save yourself a few seconds of time. They go on to say SIP can be disabled by booting into the recovery partition. To safeguard against disabling System Integrity Protection by modifying security configuration from another OS, the startup disk can no longer be set programmatically, such as by invoking the bless(8) command. SIP fixes that by preventing root from doing things such as modifying /System, /usr/bin, modifying running processes, etc.Īpple's pre-release documentation states: This is dangerous as all a process has to do is prompt for the user's admin password and they now can run as root. It's essentially a sandbox like the Mac App Store or iOS that applies to rooted processes, which up until now have had zero restrictions. In summary, Apple has added a feature to El Capitan called System Integrity Protection. I just blogged about this issue, it may be the end of the road for BootChamp, with one exception. IOMedia disk0s1 has UUID E1C3CC32-604A-4C4F-B9E6-499C2C63464DĮfi-boot-next='IOMatchIOProviderClassIOMediaIOPropertyMatchUUIDE1C3CC32-604A-4C4F-B9E6-499C2C63464DBLLastBSDNamedisk0s1'Ĭould not set boot device property: 0xe00002bc Preferred system partition found: disk1s1Ģ : = ( Preferred system partition found: disk0s1 IsPreBootEnvironmentUEFIWindowsBootCapable=1Ĭhecking if disk is complex (if it is associated with booter partitions) Here is a copy of the "full report" of one instance, it does indeed come from sandboxd.Ģ2.08.15 12:54:42,351 sandboxd: () bless(1379) System Policy: deny nvram-set efi-boot-nextīless(1379) System Policy: deny nvram-set efi-boot-nextĠ libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x00007fff8bccbc96 mach_msg_trap + 10ġ IOKit 0x00007fff8c8bdd1d io_registry_entry_set_properties + 130Ģ IOKit 0x00007fff8c8633bb IORegistryEntrySetCFProperties + 80ģ IOKit 0x00007fff8c863433 IORegistryEntrySetCFProperty + 91Ĩ libdyld.dylib 0x00007fff95f2b5ad start + 1Ġx10b8a7000 - 0x10b8c1fff bless (105) /usr/sbin/blessĠx7fff8bcba000 - 0x7fff8bcd8fff libsystem_kernel.dylib (3247.1.99) /usr/lib/system/libsystem_kernel.dylibĠx7fff8c85c000 - 0x7fff8c8cffff (2.0.2) /System/Library/Frameworks/amework/Versions/A/IOKitĠx7fff95f28000 - 0x7fff95f2bffb libdyld.dylib (360.14) /usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylibīless(11804) System Policy: deny nvram-set efi-boot-nextĠ libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x00007fff81a17c96 mach_msg_trap + 10ġ IOKit 0x00007fff83771d1d io_registry_entry_set_properties + 130Ģ IOKit 0x00007fff837173bb IORegistryEntrySetCFProperties + 80ģ IOKit 0x00007fff83717433 IORegistryEntrySetCFProperty + 91Ĩ libdyld.dylib 0x00007fff8a00e5ad start + 1Ġx106580000 - 0x10659afff bless (105) /usr/sbin/blessĠx7fff81a06000 - 0x7fff81a24fff libsystem_kernel.dylib (3247.1.99) /usr/lib/system/libsystem_kernel.dylibĠx7fff83710000 - 0x7fff83783fff (2.0.2) /System/Library/Frameworks/amework/Versions/A/IOKitĠx7fff8a00b000 - 0x7fff8a00effb libdyld.dylib (360.14) /usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylibįound ioreg "FirmwareFeaturesMask" featureMaskValue=0xF803FF37įound ioreg "FirmwareFeatures" featureFlagsValue=0xF803F537 Actually, there is one line for each reboot attempt.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |